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Abstract
Decision markets are a method of community information 
gathering, so that market methods can be used to deal 
with public decision problems. The decision made by the 
decision makers can be shown as an equilibrium price. 
This thesis would design a Public Decision Markets model 
based on the principles of futures market. By using market 
principles to gather public decision preferences and use 
the equilibrium price to represent understandings. This 
model would be able to represent public intelligence level 
on public decision making. First transferring the binary 
decision market into a tradeable contract. Then make 
personal trading decisions under market environments. 
Finally, calculate the equilibrium price based on the total 
demand and total supply, providing a group consensus on 
the public decision issue. At the end of the thesis, it would 
provide cases where publicity tactics were decided upon the 
market acceptance. Proving this public decision model can 
effectively generate decision under big data context, while 
the tendency of group consensus was underestimated.
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INTRODUCTION
Decision Market is a decision making tool designed to use 
market value as information, using equilibrium price to 
explain decision makers’ expectations on the performance 
of a product. By set up a model futures market where 
allows the trade for the predicaments for future events 
under a certain set of principles. The final price of such 
contracts would provide a clear understanding on the 
opinion that a decision maker holds to that event. There 
are two major kinds of events that a market predicament 
could predicate: “true of false” event, which is a “binary” 
decision making problem, i.e. “candidate A would be the 
president”. The liquidation price (1 when he wins, 0 when 
he loses) of such events is usually a fixed one based on 
the result (he wins the election or he loses.) In this event, 
the equilibrium price shows a public prediction on the 
possibility of such event. The other is “index” events, 
meaning the prediction is for an exact number, i.e. when 
“a CPU of 15G Hz” would come to the market. The 
final price of these events shows the public predicament 
of such event. This thesis would be the exact reverse of 
the market predication principles. Unlike the traditional 
market prediction model where the preferences of decision 
makers are shown by an equilibrium price. The decision 
support model this thesis would provide is to generate 
an equilibrium price and a group consensus when public 
preferences are known.
Public decision is a public of a society trying to 
influence the decision making process and the decisions 
that would be made, via due process or channel, in order to 
make such a decision fit in his own or a common interest. 
Public decision is different from the elite decision. Elite 
decision is to recruit a group of experts gathering different 
experience and knowledge they processed to make up the 
lack of personal intelligence or experience. Most of the 
social events in real life are decided via a public decision. 
i.e. the election of a president, box sales of a movie, the 
sales index of a new product. The public would vote 
on these issues by their choice. There are some aspects 
where public decision is different from everyday group 
decision: First of all, the decision group has influence 
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over such social event. Public decision is to make the 
prediction of future events and to make due decision on 
such matter. It would make do when such matter is a 
public on. For example, when predicting “when a CPU 
of 15G Hz” would be on the market, technology experts 
have their information gap over the general public, 
cutting the direct link between the general public and 
the result, making public decision useless in such case. 
Meanwhile, the decision group should be stakeholders 
of such events. Compared to the chaos results traditional 
poll takers would generate. The public decision model 
this thesis stands behinds is a market-oriented decision 
making process. The general public which involve in the 
deals would consider the result a matter of their interest, 
ensuring the truthfulness and effectiveness on the public 
opinion; at last, the decision group should not be part of 
interest groups, which would ensuring the effectiveness 
of such poll. In real life, decisions are usually followed 
up by interest reorganizations. Interest groups would 
lobby their way throughout the process. This is where 
the elite decision model is criticized for long. Public 
decision model can weaken the influence of interest 
groups via its mass base and simple base. With the ever-
developing information technology, internet has become 
an effective channel for public to apply their opinions. 
This thesis would present a public decision model based 
on the theory which is used to predict the market. It would 
help reach group consensus when the preferences of such 
group are known. And should be effective given as stated 
advantages of such theory.
Group decision was first used in political science. It 
was used to study poll methods. Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem of the 1960s had a fundamental impact on 
group decision studies. In the 1980s, Keeny set the goal 
for a group decision as to eliminate inequality between 
individuals. Post-WWII international policy making, 
especially technology policies is more and more influenced 
by technology experts, resulting in many studies on expert 
decision making. The “Government-Scientist” decision 
making relations has become the core of technology policy 
making. Since modern times, the public awareness and 
participation of democracy process have been greatly 
improved. The current political science studies related to 
this area are mostly focused on democracy connotations 
rather than public decision models. This thesis would use 
market prediction tools and theorize it and explain how such 
a model would be used in the practice of public decisions. 
Mainstream studies on market predicament used to take 
it as a futures market and conduct applicability analysis 
won which. This thesis would analyze so stated method 
and provide a public decision making method based on 
the market prediction principles. Where a gathering for 
group member’s subjective judgments would provide an 
equilibrium price, which, provides a possibility or index 
prediction of such event.
1. PUBLIC DECISION BUILDING BASED 
ON MARKET PREDICTION MODEL.
1.1 Variable Definitions
J: The sum of decision makers, standardized as 1
Rj: The capital in j’s procession.
πi: Result: the contract price is i .  0,1 , ,i i m n    , 
m means the result is true. n means the result is false.
pi: Result: the liquidation price is i . 
xij: Decision maker j subjectively judges that the 
possible of i is ( )0,1ijx ∈ ， 1
n
ij
i m
x
=
=∑  .
xi: Gathering J Subjective judgment probability. The 
probability density function is f(xi). Distribution function 
is F(xi).
θij: The proportion of j’s investment in contract i.
dij: Decision maker j’s need to the contract i.
One of the most valuable aspects of market prediction 
as a tool to market public decision is that it could review 
the groups’ opinion by an equilibrium price. A marketed 
decision making process takes two steps. In the first step, 
individual expresses his ideal. Assuming everyone in the 
market is an’ rational man’, the decision maker makes his 
demand upon market price and his subjective judgement. 
The second is to summarize a total demand relying on 
individual demands, and even the total demand and total 
supply via market system. Providing an equilibrium price. 
The total demand must by in even with the total supply to 
ensure the stable of the equilibrium price.
1.2 Analyze on Individual Behaviors
The individual buying behavior is based on his subjective 
judgement and the current market price. Set the utility 
of a decision maker as Uj=u(x), the predicted revenue 
of each contract as xiju(pij-πi). Assuming θij percent of a 
decision maker’s sum Rj is used to buy contract i. Then 
the expected utility of a decision maker j would be:
 
 ( )n ij jj ij ij i
i m i
R
E x u p
θ ππ== −∑  . (1)
Since m and n are symmetrical. Take m and θmj to 
expand the so stated formula with,
 
1
n
ij
i m
θ
=
=∑  it would be:
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1jj nj nj n mj j mj mj m nj nj n
n m n
R
E x u p R x u p x u pπ θ π ππ π π
 = − + − − −  
,
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i n  w h i c h ,
 ( )1 ij ij i
ij
x u p ππ −  s t a n d s  f o r  t h e 
expected utility of unit currency of contract. Set 
 ( )1ij ij ij i
i
e x u p ππ= − , an educated guess could be 
made that if
 ( ) ( )1 1 0mj mj m nj nj n
m n
x u p x u pπ ππ π− − − > ,
then, when θmj=1, a decision maker j would achieve at 
maximum expected utility. Meaning his best strategy is to 
invest all his capital in contract m. Resulting in:
  
 
,
0,
j
m n
mj m
m n
R
e e
d
e e
π
 >= 
 ≤
 . (2)
At which time
 
 
( )
   
,
0   
j
mj mj m m n
j m
R
x u p e e
E
π
π

− >= 

 , Other
. (3)
Theorem 1:  In  t he  ca se  when  x i j cons t an t , 
 ( )1ij ij ij i
i
e x u p ππ= −  is the monotonic decreasing 
function of πi
Theorem 2: In the case when emj=enj decision maker j’s 
decision on whether or not he would buy m would make 
no difference in the demand.
The theorem 1 shows that when personal subjective 
judgement is constant, while he judges the possibility 
is higher than the market price, and the demand to the 
contract still exists, when decision maker group’s demand 
to this contract is relatively high, the market demand 
would exceed the supply, increasing the market price. 
While the market price raises, personal exception on the 
utility of unit currency at the result of contract i  would 
decrease, until the condition of theorem 2 is met. Which 
is when decision maker j would exit the market dealing 
the contract i .
1.3 Group Preferences Gathering
Assumption 1: The number of contracts and the initial 
price of the market place were set by the market setter. 
Set the number of contracts as S and the initial price as π0. 
The sum of S is relevant to the activity of the market place 
and the evaluation made by the setter. 
The pricing of such prediction market is adjusted 
mainly by an electronic system based on the supply-
demand relations. Equilibrium price is when the total 
demand is equal to the total supply. The public decision 
making model this thesis stands behind based on the price 
when total demand is equal to the total supply to find out 
the final equilibrium price, which is the public decision 
consensus.
Set P(em>en) as the total number of people buy 
contract m . When m ne e> , an individual would invest 
all his capital on m . Thus the group preference needs 
to be distributed according to personal preferences. To 
figure out the exact percentage of people what would buy 
contract m :
  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
m nj m
m n mj
m mj m m nj m
u p
P e e P x
u p u p
π π
π π π π
  − − > = >  − − + − −   
 , (4)
   Set
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
m nj m
m
m mj m m nj m
u p
u p u p
π πη π π π π π
 − − =  − − + − − 
 . (5)
Similarly： ( ) ( ) ( )0 mm nP e e F x η π≤ = , function graph goes:
0 1 
D
 
( )mη π  
( )f x
  
Figure 1
The Distribution of Decision Makers’ Subjective 
Preferences 
Set xij’s distribution density function as y=f(x), the total 
capital of each decision maker in this coordinate system 
would be Rj=z(xij, y), then the total sum invested on m
would be  ( ),ij
D
z x y dσ∫∫ . Which is the volume of cylinder 
with a bottom of  ( ) ( )0 mF x η π and with the top of such 
cylindrical surface being Rj=z(xij, y).
Set total market demand equal to total market supply, 
then:
  
 ( ),ij
D
m
z x y d
S
σ
π
=
∫∫  . (6)
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At any given time the market equilibrium price must 
meet the conditions of the stated formula. Thus we can 
generate an equilibrium price that adjusts accordingly to 
the subjective judgements of decision makers and total 
capital sum.
1.4 Model Parameter Analysis
To understand the relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable, we need to control 
the irrelevant variable. At the following sessions, when 
one variable is discussed, other variable are considered 
to be irrelevant variable and are to be set to its simplest 
form, which are: Decision maker’s subjective distribution 
is to be evenly distrusted according (0, 1); every and each 
decision maker has an same amount of capital R; and their 
risk preference type is neutral.
To analyze the equilibrium price among an evenly 
distribution situation. Set decision maker’s subjective 
distribution is to be evenly distrusted according (0, 1) . 
The sum of consumers who buys the contract would be: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 11
1 2mm
m
m n mj m m
m
P e e D P x f x F x η πη π
πη π η π π
− > = = > = = = − =  −∫
the total market demand to this contract is
 
( )
( )
1
1 2
mD
m m m m
Rd
RR D
σ
π
π π π π
−⋅
= =
−
∫∫ .
Equalize total demand with total supply then:
                                                     ( )22 0m mS S R Rπ π− + + = . (7)
The equilibrium price would be
                                                                 
 ( )2 8
4m
S R S R SR
S
π + − + −=  , (8)
or                                         
 
( ) ( ) ( )22
81 1
8
4 4m
SRS R
S RS R S R SR
S S
π
 
 + + − + + + + −  = =  .                                (9)
And ensures ( )2 8 0S R SR∆ = + − ≥  . (10)
Theorem 3:Unless the sum of contracts meet the condition: ( )3 2 2S R≥ + , otherwise no reasonable equilibrium 
price would be generated.
Prove：
 ( )2 8 0S R SR∆ = + − ≥ ,
 ( )2 26 36 4 3 2 22R R RS R− −≤ = −  (Unreasonable),
 ( )2 26 36 4 3 2 22R R RS R+ −≥ = + .
In order to get the relationship between the amount 
of contract set by setters, the equilibrium price and the 
amount of capital processed by decision maker, the 
following chart was made. As the chart shows, in the 
case of a fixed capital, the equilibrium price increases 
with the contract amount to infinitely close to 0.5; in the 
case of a fixed contract, the equilibrium price decreases 
gradually from infinitely close to 0.5, while the smaller 
the number of contracts drops to, the faster the price 
declines We know under evenly distribution, the average 
value, the mode and median is 0.5. Thus the closer an 
equilibrium price is 0.5, the more accurate the public 
opinion is expressed. As we may easily find form the 
chart, the smaller amount of capital each decision maker 
holds (the found is dispersed), the more contract that 
were provided (active market), the more accurate that 
equilibrium price (public consensus) would be. Via this 
analysis, we found the decision making model this thesis 
stands behind has a tendency to underestimate group 
consensus.
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Figure 2 
How Quilibrium Price Changes With the Number of Contract 
Figure 3
How Equilibrium Price Varies With the Amount of Capital a Decision Maker Processes
2. CAST ANALYZE
There’s a suitable range for every kind of group decision 
method. The effectiveness of market predicament is 
that the people who influence the events are the people 
who took part in the poll. Thus such method can only be 
applied when the target pool can be polled, and it must be 
a general event. We use the case, the market acceptance of 
a new product, and put our model into it.
Company A is going to decide whether to increase 
its publicity effort based on the reaction of audience. 
So they introduced the appearance, function and pricing 
information in the market prediction, then issued the 
contract. If the sales number exceeds 100,000, then 
the result is true. They put out 10,000 shares, and gave 
each decision maker 100 unit currency. All decision 
maker’s risk preference is neuter, the utility function 
for that is u(x)=x, and the subjective judgement is (0,1), 
which means it distributes evenly according (0,1). The 
liquidation price chart:
ijx
( )ijf x
 
0 1 
D
 
 
Figure 4 
Subjective Judgment Evenly Distributed
Table 1
The Relationship Between the Transaction Results and 
the Liquidation Price
Result 100,000 within 3 month failed
Liquidation price 1 0
The demand for the contractor is:
 
 
100
 
,
0, Other
m n
mj
e e
d π
 >= 

Total amount of people bought the contract:
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
2
1
1 1
1 1m
m m
m n m
m m m
D P e e f x dxη π
π πη π π π π
−= > = = − = −
− + −∫
Total amount of money spent in the deal:
 ( )
( ) ( )2
1
100 100 100 1
1 1
m m
D m m m
d D
π πσ π π π
 −= = − − + −  ∫∫ .
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When the total market demand is equal to the total 
market supply:
 100
10000D
m
dσ
π =
∫∫ .
T h e  f i n a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  w o u l d  b e 
πm=0.01(unreasonable) or 0.495, which means when 
subjective judgement is evenly distributed, group tends 
to believe that there are 49.5% of chance when the sales 
index exceeds 100,000 in time. That was the simplest 
even distributed case, which explains the equilibrium 
price being so close to 0.5.
CONCLUSION
What matters is, the real life market prediction is the 
reverse of our model. The market prediction predicts the 
subjective judgement according to the equilibrium price. 
While this model generates equilibrium price with known 
distribution. In the process of market prediction, the 
equilibrium price is concluded by market self-adjustment, 
we can only get a result, and to predicate decision maker’s 
mindset and market reactions via that. The bullet point 
of this thesis, however, is to develop a decision making 
system upon the market prediction theory, which, not 
only make the best use of market prediction system, but 
also generates a group consensus on the known public 
preference. We might conclude:
First of all, the equilibrium price is not relevant to 
issue price. The issue price is relevant to setter’s final 
revenue. However, at any given active market, as long as 
the issue price is not so high that no one’s willing to buy 
in any issues, then the final equilibrium price must have 
nothing to do with the issue price. This thesis’s market 
and contract only sets the condition for “true”, making it 
a zero sum game among setter and decision makers. If the 
event is “true”, then setter would pay contract holder one 
unit of currency per contract. If the event is “false”, then 
all contract became worthless, setter win all.
Second, when decision’s subjective adjustment is 
evenly distributed, and the total sum of capital remains the 
same, then the equilibrium price would increase with the 
total amount of contracts, and the smaller decision maker’s 
capital amount goes, the higher equilibrium price raises.
Third,  when the decision maker ’s subjective 
adjustment is evenly distributed, as long as the total sum 
of contract remains the same, the equilibrium price would 
drop according to the total capital, and the smaller the 
total amount of contracts goes, the faster the equilibrium 
price drops.
Last, the group subjective adjustment pattern this 
thesis adept to gather public opinion has a tendency to 
underestimate the group consensus.
As a neo prediction and decision making system, 
market prediction is not only effective at market rates, but 
also links the general public directly before the decision 
was made, providing direct assistance in the prediction 
process. In real life, general public decides whether 
they like a new candidate, movie or product or not. But 
whether or not to put these products in front of the public 
is decided by a political party, a producer or a business 
manager. General public was not involved when these 
decisions were made. If the general public could take part 
in the decision making process, then a single vote could 
review their opinion. The truth is in the hands of a few, 
perhaps market prediction method wouldn’t provide the 
best product, movie or the most dedicated president, but it 
would generate the most loved ones.
There’s a wild range of use for market prediction, 
most public opinion gathering can practice this system. 
E-commerce and electronic Internet platforms both 
provide soil a fertile soil for this method. Especially when 
both fields have a community of public decision maker 
who can be a direct sample or platform for the method 
to be tried out. In costumer-orientated development of 
E-commerce, there’s an important tendency to focus 
on online community’s public opinions. Compared to 
current methods like grandstanding and so, this system 
can handle the force of the market more effectively, 
generating an effective market price, instead of traditional 
unilateral pricing according solely on the cost side. At this 
democracy society which is taking people’s opinions to a 
more and more important place, E-government is a great 
platform to practice the market prediction method. E.g. 
one government can issue a prediction contract on “to 
build metro or not”, and predicates the need for the public 
on the final price of such stated contract.
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